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NOVA SCOTIA’s ATTORNEY 
GENERAL & MINISTER OF 
JUSTICE TEMPORARILY BANS 
STREET CHECKS
On April 17, 2019, the Honourable Mark Furey, 
Nova Scotia’s Attorney General and Minister of 
Justice, issued a directive to all municipal police 
forces and the  Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
across the province immediately prohibiting street 
checks of pedestrians and vehicle passengers. “The 
moratorium protects people from street checks in 
public areas, such as parks, sidewalks or other 
places accessible to the public, provided there is no 
suspicious or illegal activity,” said a news release 
issued on the subject. “The directive also makes it 
clear that no activity  conducted by police, 
including a traffic stop, can be done based on 
discrimination, including race.”
The directive, however, does not apply to the 
following situations as long as they are  not 
conducted on the basis of discrimination, including 
race:
• motor vehicle stops where the driver is stopped
under statutory or common law, including:
- the Motor Vehicle Act to ensure compliance 
with license, registration, insurance and fitness 
of the vehicle; 
- the Criminal Code, or for sobriety checks; 
• police inquiries into suspicious activity;
- when inquiring into suspicious activity, police
officers are directed that where there is 
suspicious activity and it is feasible to do so, 
they should first make inquiries of an 
individual to confirm or dispel the officer's 
suspicion without requesting identifying 
information; 
• police investigations of an offence or where
police reasonably suspect that an offence has
occurred, and that the person stopped is
connected to the offence;
• investigative detention or arrest;
• executing warrants.
This directive did not replace the Minister's 
previous directive issued to police on March 28, 
2019 that prohibited the use of street checks as part 
of a quota system or as a performance 
measurement tool. 
The “Halifax, Nova Scotia: Street Checks Report” is 
available here.
“There shall be an immediate moratorium 
on street checks of pedestrians and 
passengers.”
The Honourable Mark Furey
Nova Scotia Attorney General and Minister of Justice
Minister’s Directive issued April 17, 2019
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Advanced Police Training
at the Justice Institute of BC
Looking to refresh or develop your current skills? 
The JIBC’s Advanced Training Program provides 
in-depth development opportunities for law 
enforcement officers. Some of our courses involve 
training in traditional and online investigations; 
patrol operations, as well as surveillance 
techniques and developing leadership skills. 
Sworn municipal officers, RCMP, peace officers, 
and other law enforcement officers (by approval) 
are encouraged to register. 
Upcoming Courses for 2019
Police Leadership Development @ New 
West Campus: May 6-10
Human Source Management @ Off Site: May 
13-16
Investigative Interviewing @ New West 
Campus: May 13-16
Stepwise Child Interviewing @ New West 
Campus: May 13-17 
Standard Field Sobriety Training @ New 
West Campus: May 21-24
Kidnapping for Investigators @ New West 
Campus: May 27-28
Drug Investigations @ Victoria Campus: May 
27-31
Advanced Police Training Contact Information
advancedpolicetraining@jibc.ca
604-528-5761
**2019 Course Calendar here** 
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
365 ideas for recruiting, retaining, motivating and 
rewarding your volunteers: a complete guide for 
nonprofit organizations.
first edition by Sunny Fader; revised by Angela 
Erickson.
Ocala: Atlantic Publishing Group, Inc., 2017.
HD 8039 N65 F33 2017
Cell phone distraction, human factors, and 
litigation.
T. Scott Smith, Ph. D.; contributors, Stevie  M. Breaux 
[and 13 others].
Tucson, AZ: Lawyers & Judges Publishing Company, 
Inc., 2018.
KF 2780 S65 2018
The cognitive behavioral coping skills workbook 
for PTSD: overcome fear and anxiety and reclaim 
your life.
Matthew T. Tull, PhD, Kim L. Gratz, PhD & 
Alexander L. Chapman, PhD, RPsych.
Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Publications, Inc., 
2016.
RC 552 P67 T85 2016
Companion animals and domestic violence: 
rescuing me, rescuing you.
Nik Taylor & Heather Fraser.
Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
QL 85 T39 2019
The culture question: how to create a workplace 
where people like to work
Randy Grieser, Eric Stutzman, Wendy Loewen, & 
Michael Labun.
Winnipeg, MB: Achieve Publishing, 2019.
HD 58.7 G75 2019
Digital privacy: criminal, civil and regulatory 
litigation.
general editors, Gerald Chan & Nader R. Hasan.
Toronto, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2018.
KE 1242 C6 D58 2018
Pulling together: a guide for teachers and 
instructors.
Bruce Allan, Dianne Biin, John Chenoweth, Shirley 
Anne Hardman, Sharon Hobenshield, Louise 
Lacerte, Todd Ormiston, Amy Perreault, Justin 
Wilson, Lucas Wright.
Victoria, BC: BCcampus, BC Open Textbook Project, 
2018.
E 96.2 P85 2018a
Pulling together: a guide for front-line staff, 
student services, and advisors.
Ian Cull, Robert L.A. Hancock, Stephanie McKeown, 
Michelle Pidgeon, Adrienne Vedan.
Victoria, BC: BCcampus, BC Open Textbook Project, 
2018.
E 96.2 P85 2018b
Pulling together: a guide for leaders and 
administrators.
Sybil Harrison, Janice Simcoe, Dawn Smith, Jennifer 
Stein.
Victoria, BC: BCcampus, BC Open Textbook Project, 
2018.
E 96.2 P85 2018c
Pulling together: a guide for curriculum 
developers.
Asma-na-hi Antoine, Rachel Mason, Roberta Mason, 
Sophia Palahicky, Carmen Rodriguez de France.
Victoria, BC: BCcampus, BC Open Textbook Project, 
2018.
E 96.2 P85 2018d
TED talks: the official TED guide to public 
speaking.
 Chris Anderson.
Toronto, ON: Collins, an imprint of HarperCollins 
Canada, 2016.
HF 5718.22 A53 2016
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BCFirstRespondersMentalHealth.com
IT’S TIME TO SPEAK UP ABOUT MENTAL HEALTH.
SHARE IT. DON’T WEAR IT.
WORKSAFEBCVOLUNTEER 
FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION 
OF BC
BC MUNICIPAL 
CHIEFS 
OF POLICE
BC EMERGENCY 
HEALTH 
SERVICES
BRITISH COLUMBIA 
PROFESSIONAL 
FIRE FIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION
FIRE CHIEFS’ 
ASSOCIATION
 OF BC
CANADA 
BORDER 
SERVICES 
AGENCY
FIRST NATIONS 
EMERGENCY 
SERVICES 
SOCIETY OF 
BRITISH COLUMBIA
GREATER 
VANCOUVER 
FIRE CHIEFS
 ASSOCIATION
PROVINCE 
OF BC
TRANSIT 
POLICE
ROYAL 
CANADIAN 
MOUNTED 
POLICE
AMBULANCE 
PARAMEDICS 
OF BRITISH 
COLUMBIA
BRITISH
 COLUMBIA 
POLICE 
ASSOCIATION
www.BCFirstRespondersMentalHealth.com 
For more resources on better understanding mental health in the context of the 
experiences and pressures of first responders, as well as the broader population, 
visit the following link.
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SUPREME COURT MORE 
DIVIDED ON CASES
In its report, “2018 Year in 
Review”, last years’ workload of 
Canada’s h ighes t Cour t was 
outlined. In 2018 the Supreme 
Court heard 66 appeals. This is the 
same number of appeals it heard in 
2017. The most appeals heard 
annually in the last 10 years was in 
2014 when 80 cases were brought 
before the Court. The  lowest number of appeals 
heard in a single year during  the last decade was 63 
in both 2015 and 2016.
Case Life Span 
The time it takes for the Court to render a judgment 
from the date it hears a  case was 4.8 months, up 
from 4.6  months in 2017. The shortest time within 
the last 10 years for the Court to announce its 
decision after hearing arguments was 4.1  months 
(2014) while the longest time was 7.7 months 
(2010). Overall it took 17 months in 2018, on 
average, for the Court to render an opinion from the 
time an application for leave to hear a case was 
filed. This is up from the previous year’s statistics 
when it took 15.8 months. 
Applications for Leave 
In 2018 there were 484 applications for leave, 
meaning a party sought permission to appeal the 
decision of a lower court. This represents eight fewer 
applications for leave than in 2017 and 114  less 
than 2016. Ontario was the source of most 
applications for leave at 159  cases. This was 
followed by Quebec (110), British Columbia (71) 
the Federal Court of Appeal (48), Alberta (39), 
Manitoba (20), Saskatchewan (10), New Brunswick 
and Prince Edward Island both with eight (8), Nova 
Scotia (5), Newfoundland and Labrador (4), and the 
Yukon (2). No applications for leave came from the 
Northwest Territories or Nunavut. Of the 484 leave 
applications, 39 or 8% were granted while 24 were 
pending. Of all applications for leave, 23% were 
criminal.
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Appeals Heard 
Of the 66  appeals heard in 2018, Ontario had the 
most of any province  at 17. This was followed by 
Quebec (13), Alberta (13), British Columbia (8),  the 
Federal Court of Appeal (8), Nova Scotia (2), 
Newfoundland and Labrador (2), Court Martial 
Appeal Court (1), Saskatchewan (1), and Manitoba 
(1). No appeals originated from New Brunswick, 
the Northwest Territories, the Yukon, Prince Edward 
Island or Nunavut. 
Of the appeals heard in 2018, 
50% were criminal. Thirty six 
percent (36%) were non-
Charter  criminal cases while 
14% were Charter criminal 
cases. 
Twenty one (21) of the appeals heard in 2018 were 
as of right. This source of appeal includes cases 
where  there was a dissent on a point of law in a 
provincial court of appeal. The remaining 45 cases 
had leave to appeal granted. This source of appeal 
requires permission from the Supreme Court to hear 
the case.
Appeal Judgments 
There were 64 appeal judgments released in 2018, 
up from 57 the  previous year. Twenty (20) decisions 
were delivered from the bench while the remaining 
44 were delivered after being reserved. Twenty  (20) 
appeals were allowed while 21  were dismissed. 
Twenty five (25) decisions were on reserve as at 
December 31, 2018. 
In terms of unanimity, the judges of the Supreme 
Court all agreed in only 48%  of its cases. This is the 
lowest percentage of 
unanimity in the last 10 
years. This is down 
significantly from the 
Court’s 79%  agreement 
i n 2 0 1 4 . Fo r t h e 
remaining 52%  of its 
judgments released in 
2018 the Court was 
split. 
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SUPREME COURT OF CANADA DECISIONS: SPLIT v. UNANIMOUS
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
48%54%61%70%79%68%72%75%75%63%76%
52%
46%
39%
30%
21%
32%
28%
25%25%
37%
24%
Split Unanimous
Volume 19 Issue 2 ~ March/April 2019
PAGE 8
NO DETENTION IN APPROACH 
& REQUEST FOR 
IDENTIFICATION
R. v. Culligan, 2019 MBCA 33 
A plainclothes police officer entered 
a bar to enforce the provisions of 
Manitoba’s Liquor Control Act (LCA) 
(now the Liquor, Gaming and 
Cannabis Control Act). He saw the 
accused standing in the bar with other people.  The 
officer believed he recognized the accused from 
previous dealings and had received prior 
information that the accused was on release with 
conditions for a pending criminal charge. The 
plainclothes officer requested supporting uniform 
officers enter the bar and spot check  the accused, 
confirm his identity  and determine whether he was 
breaching any possible release conditions.
When asked to produce identification, the accused 
did not comply, quickly became verbally aggressive 
and failed to respond to directions to calm 
down.  When the accused moved to approach the 
plainclothes officer, pointing at him and yelling 
“Ask the fucking narc”, the uniform officers 
physically restrained him fearing for the 
plainclothes officer’s physical safety. The accused 
was detained for causing a disturbance in a 
licensed premise under the provisions of the LCA. 
He was then immediately arrested and handcuffed. 
After the arrest, a scuffle outside the bar transpired 
where  the accused head butted an officer.  The 
accused was searched and 12 rocks of cocaine 
were found in his pocket. The accused was charged 
with several offences including resisting a peace 
officer in relation to the scuffle outside, possessing 
cocaine and breaching a condition of his release 
for failing to keep the peace. 
Manitoba Provincial Court
The accused testified that the police 
officers did not explain why they were 
asking for identification and that he 
questioned why they were doing so.  He 
denied that he became combative before being 
arrested, denied that he had cocaine in his pocket 
and denied that he attempted to head-butt an 
officer when they were outside.  The trial judge 
found the accused’s evidence not to be credible 
and accepted the police version of events. The 
accused also argued that his initial detention and 
arrest were unlawful and, therefore, all of the 
police actions that followed were also unlawful. He 
was using the illegality of his initial detention and 
arrest as a defence to the lawfulness of the police 
action and the charges that resulted. The judge, 
however, stated:
I do not accept that the Crown evidence merely 
demonstrates that [the accused] used foul 
language.  In the colourful description of [a 
uniformed officer], [the accused] “went from 
zero to pissed off in two seconds.” He 
commenced swearing and refused to calm 
down when directed to do so.  When [the 
uniformed officer] asked for identification [the 
accused] proceeded to walk towards [the 
plainclothes officer] pointing at him and 
yelling:  “Ask the fucking narc.” In the 
circumstances disclosing the identity of a 
plainclothes officer inside a crowed … bar 
could potentially place the officer at risk. In the 
context the comment which was yelled, could 
reasonably be viewed as a call to arms for the 
crowd against the officer. Given the volatile 
temper exhibited coupled with the comment 
and the fact that [the accused] was advancing 
on [the plainclothes officer], the court is 
satisfied that the objective reasonable grounds 
existed to believe that [the accused] was 
causing a disturbance as commonly defined. 
The accused was convicted of possessing cocaine, 
resisting  a peace officer and failing to comply with 
an undertaking by failing to keep the peace. He 
was sentenced to 18 months of supervised 
probation and a $396 fine was imposed.
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused challenged his convictions 
but the appeal judge dismissed his 
appeal. She held that the issue of 
whether or not the  accused had been 
unlawfully detained was not raised at trial and 
therefore she would not address it on appeal.
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Manitoba Court of Appeal
The Court of Appeal agreed 
with the  accused that the 
appeal judge erred in not 
hearing the legality of the 
detention issue and moved forward with deciding 
the case. 
The Arguments
The accused submitted, among other things, that 
the officers detained him without adequate 
grounds, and therefore unlawfully, to get his 
identification. In his view, the police detained him 
when they approached him and asked for his 
identification but this was unlawful because the 
police did not suspect him of any crime. Moreover, 
this detention was arbitrary under s. 9 of the 
Charter. Further, he was not advised of the reason 
for his detention nor advised of his right to counsel 
as required by s. 10. Since the police were not 
acting in the lawful execution of their duty in 
detaining him, he was entitled to resist the 
detention and did so in a  manner that did not 
constitute  reasonable grounds for his arrest. In 
other words, the accused’s response to his unlawful 
detention could not be used to justify his arrest.  
The accused sought acquittals on all charges or, at 
the very least, a new trial on the cocaine possession 
only charge.
The Crown, on the other hand, contended that the 
accused was not unlawfully detained or 
arrested.  Although the police  could have checked 
the computer for the accused’s conditions without 
approaching and speaking to him first, the Crown 
suggested the accused had not been detained when 
the police approached and asked him for 
identification. Moreover, even if the accused had 
been unlawfully detained, his response was so 
disproportionate that any nullification of the police 
“[T]he accused was not cooperative when he was asked for his identification.  Instead, 
he became belligerent, did not produce the identification and moved toward [the 
plainclothes officer]. None of this indicates that he believed he was deprived of the 
liberty of choice.”
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Meaning of Detention
“In summary, we conclude as follows:
1.  Detention under ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter refers 
to a suspension of the individual’s liberty interest 
by a significant physical or psychological restraint.  
Psychological detention is established either where the 
individual has a legal obligation to comply with the restrictive 
request or demand, or a reasonable person would conclude by 
reason of the state conduct that he or she had no choice but to 
comply.
2. In cases where there is no physical restraint or legal obligation, it 
may not be clear whether a person has been detained.   To 
determine whether the reasonable person in the individual’s 
circumstances would conclude that he or she had been deprived 
by the state of the liberty of choice, the court may consider, inter 
alia, the following factors:
(a) The circumstances giving rise to the encounter as they 
would reasonably be perceived by the individual:   whether 
the police were providing general assistance; maintaining 
general order; making general inquiries regarding a 
particular occurrence; or, singling out the individual for 
focussed investigation.
(b) The nature of the police conduct, including the language 
used; the use of physical contact; the place where the 
interaction occurred; the presence of others; and the 
duration of the encounter.
(c) The particular characteristics or circumstances of the 
individual where relevant, including age; physical stature; 
minority status; level of sophistication.” 
Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Charron in R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 
32 at para. 44. 
 




   
    
  

   




 
 


       

 

 
 

        

 
 
 
 

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
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       
 
  
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 
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
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acting in the lawful execution of duty ended and 
there  were reasonable grounds for his subsequent 
arrest.  With a lawful arrest, there was no basis to 
exclude the cocaine and the accused was properly 
convicted of resisting a peace officer. Furthermore, 
even if the arrest was unlawful, the Crown argued 
the cocaine could not be excluded because the 
accused made no such motion under  s. 24(2) at 
trial. 
Lawfulness of Detention/Arrest
Justice Simonsen, for the unanimous Court of 
Appeal, examined the meaning of detention as 
articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada. She 
recognized that “whether there was a detention 
will depend on all of the circumstances of the 
case.”   
In this case, there was no physical detention when 
the accused was approached for his identification. 
He was only grabbed by the arm once he moved 
toward an officer. Hence, there was no physical 
detention at the outset. Nor was there a 
psychological detention. No one suggested that a 
psychological detention was created as a result of 
the accused having a legal obligation to comply 
with the request for his identification. Nor would a 
reasonable person in the accused’s circumstances, 
by reason of police conduct, have considered that 
they had no choice but to comply with the police 
request. Justice Simonsen stated:
The trial judge found that the accused was not 
cooperative when he was asked for his 
identification.  Instead, he became belligerent, 
did not produce the identification and moved 
toward [the plainclothes officer].None of this 
indicates that he believed he was deprived of 
the liberty of choice. Rather, he made choices 
to not cooperate and to move away. On these 
facts, a reasonable person in the accused’s 
circumstances would not have concluded that 
he was deprived by the state of the liberty of 
choice to comply with the police request. The 
police simply approached him and asked for 
his identification; the jurisprudence makes 
clear that this kind of limited interaction does 
not necessarily create a detention.  In all of the 
circumstances, there was, at law, no detention 
for Charter purposes. Nor was there any prima 
facie interference with the accused’s liberty 
interests which is required, preliminarily, to 
even engage an inquiry under  Waterfield/
Dedman. [para. 28]
Police Intent
The accused contended that the police officers’ 
evidence supported the conclusion that there was a 
detention because they  testified that they intended 
to, and believed that they did, detain the accused 
when they approached him and asked for his 
identification.  Justice Simonsen, however, rejected 
this argument. 
“Regardless, and even if the police officers 
intended to detain the accused at the outset, that 
is not determinative,” she said. “There was no 
evidence or finding by the trial judge that the 
police  officers told the accused of their intention 
to detain him, and their non-communicated 
thoughts are of little  relevance in a detainee-
centred objective analysis. It is only when those 
intentions are communicated by conduct that they 
become relevant.”  
The accused’s arrest was lawful and his appeal was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“[E]ven if the police officers intended to detain the accused at the outset, that is not 
determinative. There was no evidence or finding by the trial judge that the police officers 
told the accused of their intention to detain him, and their non-communicated thoughts 
are of little relevance in a detainee-centred objective analysis.  It is only when those 
intentions are communicated by conduct that they become relevant.” 
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 JURY UNANIMITY IN 
REJECTING EACH SELF-DEFENCE 
ELEMENT NOT REQUIRED
R. v. Randhawa, 2019 BCCA 15
The accused, while in a  bar, was 
asked by a woman to take a 
photograph of her and some friends 
using her phone. An altercation 
arose  between the accused and 
other patrons. Words were exchanged and a  brawl 
broke out. The accused brandished a knife  and 
stabbed six people. He was charged with six counts 
of aggravated assault and possessing a weapon for a 
dangerous purpose. 
British Columbia Supreme Court
The accused did not contest the 
underlying conduct establishing the 
e l e m e n t s o f t h e o f f e n c e s . H e 
acknowledged that he stabbed each of 
the victims. He testified that there were  bodies 
swarming around him, he was punched in the face 
and upper body, and bodies were hurled on top of 
him. His knee  was bent awkwardly. He felt there 
were ten to twelve hands punching him during 
parts of the fight, meaning five or six men were 
beating him. He pulled a knife from his pocket, 
opened it and swung it around. The accused relied 
on the self-defence provisions under s. 34 of the 
Criminal Code. 
When the judge gave the jury instructions on self-
defence, the judge said the  onus was not on the 
accused to prove he acted in self defence. Rather, 
the burden was on the Crown to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused did not act in 
self-defence. In doing so, the jury  would have to 
consider three (3) questions:
• Had the Crown proven that the accused did
not believe  on reasonable grounds that force
was being used against him?
• Had the Crown proven that the accused did
not commit the act for the purpose of
defending or protecting himself from the use 
of force?
• Had the Crown proven that the accused’s act
was not reasonable in the circumstances?
BY THE BOOK:
s. 34 Criminal Code
Defence — use or threat of force
s. 34  (1)   A person is not guilty of an offence if
(a) they believe on reasonable grounds that 
force is being used against them or another 
person or that a threat of force is being made 
against them or another person;
(b) the act that constitutes the offence is committed for the 
purpose of defending or protecting themselves or the 
other person from that use or threat of force; and
(c) the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances.
Factors
(2) In determining whether the act committed is reasonable in 
the circumstances, the court shall consider the relevant 
circumstances of the person, the other parties and the act, 
including, but not limited to, the following factors:
(a)   the nature of the force or threat;
(b)    the extent to which the use of force was imminent and 
whether there were other means available to respond to 
the potential use of force;
(c)   the person's role in the incident;
(d)   whether any party to the incident used or threatened to 
use a weapon;
(e)  the size, age, gender and physical capabilities of the 
parties to the incident;
(f)  the nature, duration and history of any relationship 
between the parties to the incident, including any prior 
use or threat of force and the nature of that force or 
threat;
(f.1) any history of interaction or communication between the 
parties to the incident;
(g)    the nature and proportionality of the person’s response to 
the use or threat of force; and
(h)   whether the act committed was in response to a use or 
threat of force that the person knew was lawful.
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If the jury were to reject self-defence, it need not 
be unanimous on which question(s) they answered 
“yes” to as long as they all agreed that one or more 
of these questions was answered “yes”. 
A jury convicted the accused on five counts of 
aggravated assault and one count of possessing a 
weapon for a dangerous purpose. A six person 
stabbed did not testify and the  accused was 
acquitted in relation to that charge. He was 
sentenced to 18 months in jail for each aggravated 
assault conviction, to run concurrently, and an 
additional concurrent six-month sentence for 
possessing a weapon for a dangerous purpose. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
trial judge erred in instructing 
the jury on self-defence. In his 
v i e w , a j u r y m u s t b e 
unanimous on which of the three elements of the 
defence the Crown has disproved. In other words, 
juror unanimity was required on which question of 
self-defence was answered “yes”. The Crown, on 
the other hand, submitted that each juror only 
need to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that one element of the self-defence provision did 
not apply. In other words, the Crown asserted there 
was no requirement that the jury be unanimous on 
which question they answered “yes”. 
Self-Defence
Unlike the Crown’s burden in which it must prove 
each and every essential element of an offence 
beyond a reasonable doubt, it need only disprove 
one element of the defence of self-defence beyond 
a reasonable  doubt. In this case, since all three 
criteria in s. 34(1) must be present for the defence 
of self-defence to be available, once an air of 
reality to the defence has been raised the Crown 
need only prove beyond a reasonable  doubt one of 
the three elements of the  defence did not apply. A 
unanimous view by every  juror about each 
element of the defence is not required. “Juror 
unanimity  is required only on the ultimate 
conclusion: whether the Crown proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused did not act in 
self-defence,”  said Justice Griffin, writing the 
Appeal Court’s decision. “If this Court were  to 
accept [the accused’s] argument, it could lead to 
the strange result that an accused would be 
acquitted because the Crown failed to disprove 
the defence of self-defence, even though each 
juror unanimously  agreed, but in their own ways, 
that they were satisfied beyond a  reasonable 
doubt that the defence did not apply.”
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Rhandawa, 2018 BCSC 545.
MEANING OF WOUNDING IN 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 
PROVISION
R. v. Pootlass, 2019 BCCA 96
A man heard his door open while he 
lay in his bed. The accused, who the 
man knew, entered the room. The man 
thought the accused was going to ask 
for a  cigarette. Instead, however, the 
accused began punching  the man repeatedly in the 
head and continued to do so for about 30 to 40 
seconds. After the  attack, the man was found 
bleeding in the lobby and an ambulance was 
called. 
The man had two cuts, one on his forehead and 
one on the back of his head. The  forehead cut 
required five or six stitches, and the other required 
five or six staples. The accused was charged with 
aggravated assault under s.  268 of the  Criminal 
Code. 
“Juror unanimity is required only on the ultimate conclusion: whether the Crown proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did not act in self-defence.”
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British Columbia Provincial Court
The judge found the  victim’s injuries did 
not amount to a wound. He said, “a 
wound contemplates a  tissue injury that 
results in permanent damage or long-
standing dysfunction, including injuries that result 
in serious internal or external bleeding or other 
serious internal tissue damage.” Since the injuries 
did not fall within this meaning, the judge 
acquitted  the accused of aggravated assault, but 
convicted him of the  lesser included offence of 
assault causing bodily harm instead.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The Crown argued the trial 
judge erred by finding that a 
wound under s. 268 required 
“permanent damage or long-
standing dysfunction”. The Crown submitted that 
the word “wound” required no more than a 
breaking of the skin that bleeds and something that 
amounted to more  than minor bodily  harm. The 
accused, on the other hand, contended that the 
trial judge did not err in holding that the victim’s 
injuries were not sufficiently serious to be an 
aggravated assault. 
Aggravated Assault
Section 268(1) of the Criminal Code creates the 
offence of aggravated assault. It reads:
Every one commits an aggravated assault 
who wounds, maims, disfigures or endangers 
the life of the complainant.
“Wound”, however, is not defined.  In determining 
whether an injury rises to the  level of a “wound” in 
s. 268(1) Justice Bennett, authoring  the  unanimous
Court of Appeal decision, examined the legislative 
history of the word “wound” as it appeared in 
United Kingdom offences and Canadian criminal 
statutes. 
She also noted that today’s Criminal Code  utilizes a 
three-tier scheme for assaults of increasing 
seriousness: 
(1) assault simpliciter, 
(2) assault causing bodily harm and 
(3) aggravated assault. 
“Bodily  harm” is defined in s. 2 as “any hurt or 
injury to a  person that interferes with the health or 
comfort of the person and that is more than merely 
transient or trifling in nature”.  As for bodily harm, 
Justice Bennett found it “is defined in terms of both 
the significance of the injury  and  its persistence 
through time—bodily harm can be either trifling 
or transient as long as it is not both.”
Justice Bennett recognized that “aggravated assault 
is a  more serious offence than assault causing 
bodily harm”  and therefore requires something 
more.  She also noted that courts in Alberta have 
required a “wound” to result in permanent or long-
lasting damage while courts in Ontario have 
required the injury to be more than merely trifling, 
fleeting or minor. In British Columbia, some courts 
have held that a “wound” required more than 
minor bodily harm.
Since aggravated assault by wounding is more 
serious than assault causing bodily harm in both 
penalty and the fact assault causing bodily harm is 
a lesser and included offence of aggravated assault, 
Bennett decided that the definition of a “wound” 
must include a more serious consequence. 
In defining the word “wound” in s. 268(1), Justice 
Bennett rejected a  requirement that the injury be 
permanent or long-lasting. Nor would any injury 
that meets or marginally  exceeds “bodily harm” as 
long as it bleeds suffice. Rather, wounding  will 
require a consequence sufficiently more severe 
than mere  bodily harm. Bennett concluded that 
wounding requires “serious bodily harm”. She 
stated:
[T]he definition of ‘wound’ contemplated by 
the aggravated assault provision is a break in 
the continuity of both the epidermal and 
dermal layers of the skin that constitutes serious 
bodily harm. [para. 3]
And further:
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[A] wound, as the word is used in s. 268(1) of 
the  Code, is a break in the continuity of the 
whole skin that constitutes serious bodily harm. 
Serious bodily harm is any hurt or injury that 
interferes in a substantial way with the integrity, 
health or well-being of the complainant. [para. 
113]
In this case, the injuries to the victim amounted to 
wounding. They were  breaks in the continuity of 
the skin (they bled) that constituted a  substantial 
interference with the physical integrity or well-
being of the victim. “[The victim’s] bleeding is 
decisive evidence of a break in the continuity of 
his whole skin,”  said Justice Bennett. “A cut that 
requires five stitches or staples is a substantial 
interference with someone’s physical integrity.”
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s 
conviction for assault causing bodily harm was set 
aside, and a conviction for aggravated assault was 
substituted. The accused’s sentence, however, was 
not changed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
OBSTRUCTION ARREST 
RESULTING FROM INCOMPLETE 
IDENTIFICATION PROCESS 
LAWFUL
R. v. Lloyd, 2019 BCCA 128
Two plain clothes police officers in 
an unmarked police car saw the 
accused and a companion leaving 
the Downtown Eastside, an area 
known for drugs and drug related 
offences. They were headed to an area known for 
its high rate of property crime, particularly theft 
from autos. When the two men sat down at the 
sidewalk tables of a coffee shop and began to 
smoke cigarettes within six meters of the doorway, 
which was prohibited by a city bylaw, the police 
officers approached them with the possibility of 
issuing a bylaw ticket in mind. One of the officers 
believed he may have dealt with the accused about 
a year earlier. The officers advised the men that they 
were police officers investigating a bylaw infraction 
for smoking within six meters of a doorway, told 
them that they  were not free  to leave and asked for 
their names and dates of birth. The accused was 
uncooperative but eventually gave his name after 
being asked two or three times. The accused was 
agitated, verbally  challenging, saying it was 
“bullshit” to be asked his name, and stated the 
police had no reason to stop him. 
One of the officers queried both names on the 
computer in the police car. Before the process was 
complete, the other officer noticed a bulge in the 
accused’s clothing, near his rear hip, that he 
suspected to be a weapon based on its size, shape 
and placement. The officer also noted the accused 
was “blading” – turning  his hip at an angle away 
from the police. The accused was moving  around, 
looking from side to side, and backing away. The 
officers were  concerned that the accused was about 
to run. They advised him again that he was not free 
to go and warned him of the offence of obstructing 
police, but he continued to back away. When an 
officer attempted to grab his arm, the accused 
lashed upwards with a closed fist and an intense 
fight ensued which took them all to the pavement. 
The accused attempted to draw a knife from his 
waistband. The police knocked the knife out of his 
hand and a  bystander retrieved it. The accused was 
arrested, handcuffed and searched. One of the 
officers sustained a fractured rib. A leather purse 
the accused was carrying under his shirt contained 
$8,000 in drugs in small plastic bags including 
about 26 grams of cocaine, 57 grams of 
methamphetamine, and 51 grams of a heroin and 
fentanyl combination. The accused was also 
carrying a digital scale, two knives, and $1,780 in 
cash. He was charged with several offences 
including assault with a weapon (knife), carrying a 
concealed weapon (knife), possessing a weapon 
dangerous to the public peace, obstruction, 
possessing cocaine, methamphetamine, and heroin 
and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking. 
British Columbia Provincial Court
The accused argued the entire  police 
investigation was predicated on a ruse 
because  the police abandoned their 
interest in the possible theft offences 
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and turned to the bylaw smoking infraction. In his 
view, the ruse was intended to give the police a 
reason to interact with him to find out who he was 
in the  absence of grounds to investigate him for any 
other offence. Alternatively, the accused submitted 
that the arrest for obstruction was unlawful because 
the o f f icers had a l ready completed the 
identification of the accused: they had learned his 
name and one of them recognized it. At this point, 
the accused contended that he was free to leave 
and therefore the police had no further reason to 
detain him, the arrest was therefore unlawful, and 
the ensuing search violated s. 8 of the Charter.
The judge held that the  police did not try to 
conceal the initial purpose of their investigation. 
She then found that “having more than one reason 
to stop a suspect, including specifically having 
other reasons for wanting to identify a  suspect, 
does not transform a lawful stop into an unlawful 
one.” In this case, the police, having abandoned 
their interest in whether the accused was 
committing theft offences, had the authority under 
Vancouver’s Health Bylaw to approach the accused 
for smoking within six meters of the door to the 
café. The judge stated:
[The police] evidence was clear and specific 
that the accused and his companion were 
inhaling from lit cigarettes and exhaling smoke. 
The police identified themselves. They 
explained the bylaw infraction and advised the 
accused he was required to identify himself. 
Although he did not immediately identify 
himself, he did, after a few requests, provide a 
name.
It was while the police were entering the query 
relating to that name, but before they received 
the response back, that the situation escalated. 
At this point, the police had to make a split-
second decision whether to let him walk away, 
as they suspected he was going to do, or 
whether they should take steps to keep him at 
the scene until the identification was 
confirmed. 
The judge concluded that the  police had not yet 
completed their confirmation of the accused’s 
identity  and were  still engaged in the execution of 
their duty to identify  him at the time of the 
obstructive conduct. “I find it was part of the 
execution of their duty for the police to detain the 
accused until identification was confirmed and the 
ticket could be  personally served,”  said the judge. 
She concluded that the arrest was lawful and the 
search justified as an incidental to arrest as a safety 
search, as the officers had reason to believe the 
accused was carrying a  weapon and was backing 
away while  blading his body.  The evidence was 
therefore admissible. The accused was convicted of 
multiple counts of possessing controlled substances 
for the purposes of trafficking, carrying a concealed 
weapon, possession of a weapon for a purpose 
dangerous to the public peace, obstructing a peace 
officer, and assaulting a peace officer with a 
weapon. He was sentenced to six years in prison. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
convictions submitting that the 
trial judge erred in holding his 
arrest lawful and the search 
incidental thereto reasonable. But the Court of 
Appeal disagreed. The accused could not 
demonstrate any palpable and overriding errors of 
fact made by the trial judge. Rather, he was simply 
trying to reargue his case at trial. “[The accused] 
has not demonstrated any reversible error in the 
judge’s findings or reasoning,” said Justice Harris 
for the Court of Appeal. “What he has done is 
attempt to persuade us that the judge ought to 
have reached different conclusions, for example, 
by taking a different view of the credibility of the 
officers or in her assessment of whether subjective 
and objective grounds existed for the arrest.”  The 
trial judge’s material findings of fact were well-
supported by the evidence. The accused’s appeal 
was dismissed substantially for the  reasons given by 
the trial judge. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Editor’s Note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Lloyd, 2019 BCCA 128, R. v. Lloyd, (16 May 2017) 
File No: 233735-2-C (BCPC), R. v. Lloyd, (18 
September 2017) File No: 233735-2-C (BCPC).
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QUESTIONING CONSISTENT 
WITH TRAFFIC STOP PURPOSE: 
NO CHARTER BREACH
R. v. Zolmer, 2019 ABCA 93
An Alberta police officer pulled the 
accused’s vehicle over after noting it 
had tinted windows and its licence 
plate was not visible. He told the 
accused the reasons for the stop and 
entered into a two minute and 38 second 
conversation with him. The officer asked the 
accused who owned the vehicle, where he was 
coming from and going to, how long he had lived 
in Vancouver, and, toward the end of his inquiry, 
asked if the accused was “okay” since he appeared 
nervous and was visibly shaking. The officer also 
observed various food wrappers in the vehicle, 
along with a toolbox and suitcase in the back. 
After the conversation, the officer then went back 
to his police vehicle with the accused’s BC driver’s 
license and the  registration of his mother’s vehicle 
from Saskatchewan. A criminal records check 
indicated only previous convictions for impaired 
driving and for aggravated assault. The officer also 
searched a police data base that contained an entry 
concerning the accused from two weeks earlier.  
The officer called backup to the stop, including one 
officer with a drug detector dog. The officer 
returned to the accused’s vehicle, asked him to step 
out of it and place his hands on the hood of the 
vehicle. The officer then told the accused that he 
was under detention for a drug investigation and 
was advised of his right to contact a lawyer, but he 
declined. The  accused was patted down and placed 
inside a police car. The police dog conducted a 
“free air sniff” around the accused’s vehicle 
resulting in numerous positive responses for drugs. 
The accused was then advised that he was under 
arrest for possessing a controlled substance and 
was again advised of his right to contact counsel. At 
that point, the accused indicated that he wished to 
speak to counsel and to exercise his right to remain 
silent. The accused’s vehicle was then searched 
BY THE BOOK:
s. 166 Alberta’s Traffic Safety Act
Stopping for Peace Officer
s. 166 (1) For the purposes of administering and
enforcing this Act or a bylaw, a peace officer 
may
(a)  with respect to a vehicle, 
(i) signal or direct a driver of a vehicle to stop the vehicle, and
(ii) request information from the driver of the vehicle and any 
passengers in the vehicle, 
and
(b) with respect to a pedestrian using or located on a highway, 
request information from that pedestrian.
(2) When signalled or directed to stop by a peace officer who 
is readily identifiable as a peace officer, a driver of a vehicle 
shall
(a)  forthwith bring the vehicle to a stop,
(b)  forthwith  furnish  to the peace officer any information 
respecting the driver or the vehicle that the peace officer 
requires, and
(c)  remain  stopped  until permitted by the peace officer to 
leave.
(3) At the request of a peace officer who is readily identifiable 
as a peace officer, a passenger in a vehicle who is acting in a 
manner that is contrary to this Act or a bylaw shall forthwith 
furnish to the peace officer the passenger’s name and address. 
(4) At the request of a peace officer who is readily identifiable 
as a peace officer, a pedestrian using or located on a highway 
in a manner contrary to this Act or a bylaw shall forthwith 
furnish to the peace officer the pedestrian’s name and address.  
This entry referred to a  vehicle  stop before 
midnight between a police officer and the 
accused in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. The 
accused had been stopped for speeding, was 
evasive, and enroute in his mom’s vehicle from 
Vancouver to Moose Jaw. The officer at that time 
noted the route didn’t make sense but there was 
insufficient grounds to pipeline him. There was 
no backup available otherwise the officer would 
have tried to use a detector dog.
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incidental to the arrest. A Beretta handgun was 
located in the toolbox in the backseat along with 
an ounce of methamphetamine and five ounces of 
cocaine. The accused was permitted to contact a 
lawyer at the police station and he was 
subsequently charged with weapons offences, and 
possessing cocaine and methamphetamine for the 
purpose of trafficking. 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The officer testified that the Saskatoon 
police entry was “a game changer” 
during the interaction. In his view, the 
entry  elevated the circumstances to a 
reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify placing the 
accused under investigative detention.
The judge found the officer’s questioning of the 
accused as to his travels were not outside the 
parameters of a  traffic stop and therefore not in 
excess of his duties. Even if there was a very narrow 
window of legitimate inquiry by a police  officer 
during a traffic stop, asking about the distance 
travelled over a time period and under what 
circumstances could be relevant to the police 
officer’s determining if the driver was fatigued or 
confused.  The content of the conversation in this 
case  did not exceed the authority  of s. 166 of 
Alberta’s Traffic Safety Act. “Each question was 
reasonably and logically connected to information 
[the accused] provided as required by the  Traffic 
Safety Act  ..., s. 166, or flowed logically from 
information [the  accused] had previously provided 
voluntarily, or arose out of [the officer’s] 
observation of [the accused’s] physical condition,” 
said the judge. “The conversation was appropriate 
routine police interaction with a driver during a 
traffic stop. It was short in duration, required the 
production of only a few documents, and 
inconvenienced [the accused] minimally.” There 
was no s. 8 Charter breach when the officer 
engaged the accused in the conversation.
As for the investigative detention which began 
when the accused was instructed to step out of his 
vehicle, none of the circumstances on their own 
would have provided the officer with a reasonable 
suspicion. However, their totality met the 
reasonable suspicion threshold. The accused’s 
detention did not breach s. 9 and he was advised of 
the reason for his detention and of his right to 
counsel as required by s. 10. The pat-down search 
and use of the sniffer dog was also justified. 
Moreover, once the dog indicated the presence of 
drugs, the officer had reasonable grounds to arrest 
the accused and search his vehicle incidental to 
arrest. There  were no Charter breaches, the 
evidence was admissible and the accused was 
convicted of possessing methamphetamine and 
cocaine for the  purpose of trafficking and illegal 
possession of a handgun with ammunition. 
Furthermore, even if the Charter was breached, the 
evidence was nonetheless admissible under s. 
24(2).
Alberta Court of Appeal 
The accused argued that the 
officer’s contact with him was 
pretextual - an unfounded 
general inquisition aimed at 
drug interdiction at the start or very early in the 
interaction. He submitted that the police officer’s 
dominant objective rendered the stop an arbitrary 
detention almost immediately. He said the officer’s 
“[F]or at least two hundred years it has been accepted that police might extend their 
investigations opportunistically while exercising an initial lawful authority provided the 
extension is reasonable. Resort, therefore, to other statutory or common law authorities 
should not be automatically presumed to be pre-textual. Such authorities do not 
automatically vanish simply because the police happen to have -- or happen to develop 
-- during their dealings with the subject a basis for additional authorities of a different 
sort. 
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mind must have formed a reasonable suspicion for 
investigative detention beyond the traffic stop and 
that state of mind engaged police duties under ss. 
10(a) and 10(b). The improper questioning was thus 
contrary to s. 10, and unreasonable searches 
resulted from the dog  sniff and pat-down search. In 
the accused’s opinion, the evidence of the drugs 
and gun with ammunition ought to have been 
excluded. The Crown, on the other hand, suggested 
that the officer made a traffic stop which evolved 
into a drug investigation without any Charter 
violations.
Statutory Authority
The Court of Appeal first acknowledged the reality 
that even criminals are subject to Alberta’s Traffic 
Safety Act and other legal authorities. In its review 
of this topic, the Appeal Court’s comments included 
the following:
[F]or at least two hundred years it has been 
accepted that police might extend their 
invest igat ions opportunis t ical ly whi le 
exercising an initial lawful authority provided 
the extension is reasonable. Resort, therefore, 
to other statutory or common law authorities 
should not be automatically presumed to be 
pre - tex tua l . Such au thor i t i e s do no t 
automatically vanish simply because the police 
happen to have -- or happen to develop -- 
during their dealings with the subject a basis 
for  additional  authorities of a different sort. 
[references omitted, para. 36]
[I]t is hard to discern how the law could 
provide bright line guidance for police officers 
engaged in highway patrol vigils about the 
internal semantical contours of any short 
conversations they might have or any 
questioning they might pose. … [A]nalytical 
purity is not to be expected during roadside 
dynamics. At a certain stage, to be sure, a 
conversation might clearly become an 
unrelated interrogation and thus require some 
new foundation in law and fact. But it is not 
clear how the police could be guided 
within Charter compliance by courts engaging 
in an after the fact editing function towards the 
natural flow of a short and video recorded 
roadside conversation. [reference omitted, 
para. 42]
In any instances of exercise of legal authority, 
of course, the police must conduct themselves 
within the scope of any authority thus given. 
[reference omitted, para 43]
Initial Questioning
The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that 
the substance of the officer’s questioning was 
consistent with a traffic stop purpose and did not 
result in an investigative detention for drugs until 
the accused was directed to step from the vehicle. 
Up until that point, any non-communicated 
intention by the officer was not reflected in his 
conduct. “Criminal law detention does not 
commence the  moment an officer forms a non-
communicated intention to detain let alone by her 
merely forming an opinion that might justify 
detention,” said the Appeal Court. “Until the 
[accused] was instructed to step out of the vehicle, 
the nature of his waiting there had not become a 
criminal law detention, in this case, for drugs.” The 
questions and answers therefore did not breach s. 
10(a) or (b) of the Charter.
Reasonable Suspicion
In this case, the trial judge ruled the officer had the 
necessary reasonable suspicion to detain the 
accused for a drug investigation and to use the 
sniffer dog. Although the accused tried to isolate 
each item of fact and suggest each was not much, 
such a piecemeal approach was not appropriate 
when considering factors leading to suspicion. The 
information from the earlier police encounter 
added to what the officer knew. “It  represented 
something of a pattern in relation to drug courier 
type activity,” said the Court of Appeal. “The 
information acquired in the first  contact was not 
out of bounds in terms of providing [the officer] 
“A police officer is not required to apply a reasonable doubt standard to each indicium of 
suspicious conduct. It is a totality of circumstances.”
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with a reasonable suspicion on the second contact 
even if in one sense they were similar. The 
behaviour of the [accused] on both occasions gave 
rise in the police-experienced mind of [the officer] 
to such suspicion when added to present facts, and 
the trial judge considered that suspicion to be 
reasonable. … [S]uspicion is concerned with 
possibilities, not probabilities.” Moreover, “a 
police  officer is not required to apply  a reasonable 
doubt standard to each indicium of suspicious 
conduct. It is a totality of circumstances.”
Arrest
The dog sniff provided the police with reasonable 
grounds to believe there were drugs in the vehicle. 
That justified the arrest and the search of the 
vehicle incident to arrest. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
NO CHARTER BREACH IN 
POSING AS FICTITIOUS 14-
YEAR-OLD GIRL ONLINE
R. v. Mills, 2019 SCC 22
A police officer created a  Hotmail 
email account for a fictitious 14-year-
old girl named “Leann”, together 
with a  Facebook page and profile 
containing background information. 
This included information that she was a high 
school student along with a photo from the 
internet. About a month later, the  officer received a 
Facebook message from the accused (a 32-year-old 
man at the time). Over a  period of about two 
months, there was an exchange of emails, 
including a photo of his penis. The officer used 
screen shot software called “Snagit” to capture all 
the information on his computer screen during 
each communication with the accused. A meeting 
at a park was arranged with “Leann” and, when the 
accused showed up, he was arrested and 
subsequently charged with communicating via  a 
computer system for the purposes of committing 
sexual offences (child luring under s. 172.1 
Criminal Code). 
Newfoundland & Labrador Provincial Court
The police were able to identify the 
documents produced by  the “Snagit” 
screen captures and testified that they 
were accurate.  The judge, however, 
went on to find the messages were “private 
communications” and concluded that the accused’s 
s. 8 Charter right to be secure against unreasonable
search or seizure had been breached because the 
police failed to meet the requirements under Part VI 
o f the Cr imina l Code by not obta in ing 
authorizations to intercept the  electronic 
communications. In the judge’s view, the police 
were required to obtain an authorization under s. 
184.2 of the Criminal Code to use Snagit. The 
judge, nevertheless, admitted the evidence under s. 
24(2).
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MEMORIAL SERVICE
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Parliament Hill
Ottawa, Ontario
NATIONAL 
PEACE OFFICERS’ 
MEMORIAL DAY 
SERVICE
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The accused was convicted of communicating by 
means of a computer with a person believed to be 
under the age of sixteen years for a  sexual purpose. 
He was sentenced to 14 months imprisonment, 
which was reduced by two months to compensate 
for the Charter violation. He was also sentenced to 
one-year probation and ordered to provide a 
sample of his DNA.
Newfoundland Court of Appeal
Justice Welsh, delivering the 
Court of Appeal’s opinion, 
concluded the accused did not 
have an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his communications with 
“Leann.” Further, ss. 184 and 184.2 of the Criminal 
Code  only apply where there is an “intercept”.  In 
this case, Justice Welsh concluded there  was no 
interception and therefore no authorization under 
Part VI was required. 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the two month 
sentence reduction was set aside and the sentence 
of 14 months imprisonment was affirmed.  
However, the additional two months imprisonment 
was stayed as requested by Crown.
Supreme Court of Canada
The accused appealed 
to the  Supreme Court of 
Canada arguing the 
investigative technique 
employed by the undercover police officer was a 
search or seizure of his online communications and 
the that this intercept required prior judicial 
authorization. The Supreme Court rejected the 
accused’s appeal, with justices rendering four 
separate opinions.
Say Three
Justice Brown, speaking for 
himself and two other justices, 
agreed with the Court of Appeal 
that the accused did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Although he had 
a subjective  expectation of privacy in his electronic 
communications in the Facebook chat and email 
messages, his subjective expectation of privacy was 
not objectively reasonable in the totality of the 
circumstances, including:
• Nature of the Privacy Interest
➡ The accused was communicating with
someone he believed was a child and stranger 
to him—“adults cannot reasonably expect 
privacy  online with children they do not 
know.”
➡ “That the communication occurs online does 
not add a layer of privacy, but rather a layer 
of unpredictability.”
➡ “The police  were using an investigative 
technique allowing it to know from the 
outset that the adult was conversing with a 
child who was a stranger.”
• Nature of the Investigative Technique
➡ The police created the fictitious child and
knew from the outset that the relationship 
was fictitious, therefore there was no risk of a 
potential privacy breach.
“The police were using an investigative 
technique allowing it to know from the 
outset that the adult was conversing with 
a child who was a stranger.”
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Part VI of the Criminal Code  also did not apply 
because  the communications in this case were not 
“private communications” as defined in s. 183. “A 
communication made under circumstances in 
which there is no reasonable expectation of 
p r i v a c y c a n n o t c o n s t i t u t e a ‘ p r i v a t e 
communication’ for the purpose of s. 183,”  said 
Justice Brown. Since the accused failed to establish 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
conversations with “Leann”, his appeal was 
dismissed.
Say Two
Justice Karakatsanis, with Chief 
J u s t i c e  Wa g n e r c o n c u r r i n g , 
concluded that an undercover officer 
communicating in writing with an 
individual does not commit a search or seizure 
within the meaning of s. 8. “It is not reasonable to 
expect that your messages will be kept private 
from the intended recipient (even if the intended 
recipient is an undercover officer),” she said. 
“Further, the police conduct does not amount to a 
search or seizure — the police did not take 
anything from the accused or intrude on a  private 
conversation; the undercover officers simply 
received messages sent directly  to them.”  Here, the 
officer posed as a young girl and conversed with 
the accused through Faceboook messenger and 
email. This was not a search or seizure:
Here, the police did not interfere with a private 
conversation between other individuals; they 
directly participated in it. Because the 
conversation occurred via email and Facebook 
messenger, it necessarily took place in a written 
form. The screenshots from the computer 
program “Snagit” are simply a copy of the pre-
existing written record and not a separate 
surreptitious permanent record created by the 
state. [para. 37]
And further:
… s. 8 of the Charter  is not engaged merely 
because an undercover officer converses 
electronically with an individual. This is 
because  (1) it is not reasonable for the  sender 
“A communication made under circumstances in which there is no reasonable expectation 
of privacy cannot constitute a ‘private communication’ for the purpose of s. 183.”
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to expect that the messages will be kept 
private from the intended recipient (even if 
the recipient is an undercover officer); and 
(2) the police conduct of communicating 
with an individual does not amount to a 
search or seizure. Either way, the outcome is 
the same — s. 8  is not violated when police 
simply communicate  with an individual. 
[para. 51]
Justice Karakatsanis also found the use of 
screenshot technology (Snagit) did not constitute a 
search or seizure requiring some form of judicial 
authorization. “The ‘Snagit’ screenshots are just a 
copy of the written messages,”  she said. ”This use 
of technology is not intrusive or surreptitious state 
conduct.” Since s. 8 was not engaged, it was 
unnecessary to determine where there was an 
intercept as defined in Part VI. 
Say One
Justice Moldaver was of the view that 
the reasons of Justice Brown and Justice 
Karakatsanis were both “sound in law” 
and each formed a proper basis for 
dismissing the accused’s appeal.
A Different View
Justice Martin opined that the  accused 
did have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his communications with 
“Leann” and the police  surveillance of 
these private communications amounted to an 
unreasonable search. She also found the  use of 
“Snagit” to record the communications in real-time 
required prior judicial authorization under s. 184.2. 
Nevertheless, Justice Martin would have admitted 
the evidence of the communications under s. 24(2) 
of the Charter.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s Note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Mills, 2017 NLCA 12.
“… s. 8 of the Charter is not engaged merely because an undercover officer converses 
electronically with an individual. This is because (1) it is not reasonable for the sender to 
expect that the messages will be kept private from the intended recipient (even if the 
recipient is an undercover officer); and (2) the police conduct of communicating with an 
individual does not amount to a search or seizure. Either way, the outcome is the same 
— s. 8 is not violated when police simply communicate with an individual.”
BY THE BOOK:
s. 183 Criminal Code
private communication 
m e a n s a n y o r a l 
communication, or any 
telecommunication, that 
is made by an originator 
who is in Canada or is 
i n t e n d e d b y t h e 
originator to be received 
by a person who is in 
C a n a d a a n d t h a t i s m a d e u n d e r 
circumstances in which it is reasonable for 
the originator to expect that it will not be 
intercepted by any person other than the 
person intended by the originator to receive 
it, and includes any radio-based telephone 
communication that is treated electronically 
or otherwise for the purpose of preventing 
intelligible reception by any person other 
than the person intended by the originator to 
receive it.
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Cannabis use by province – 4th quarter, 2018  
Statistics Canada is conducting the National Cannabis Survey, every three months 
throughout 2018 and into 2019. These data are about Canadians, 15 and older, and 
reflect their cannabis use and related behaviours in the past three months.
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ILLICT DRUG OVERDOSE 
DEATHS IN 2019
The Office of BC’s Chief Coroner has released 
statistics for illicit drug overdose deaths in the 
province from January 1, 2009 to January 31, 
2019. In January 2019 there were 90 suspected 
drug overdose deaths. This represents a -31% 
decrease over the number of deaths occurring in 
January 2018 and a -22% decrease over December 
2018. 
In 2018, there were a total of 1,510 suspected drug 
overdose deaths. This is an increase of 24) deaths 
over the 2017 numbers (1,486). 
Overall, the 2018 statistics amount to about 4 
people dying every day of the year.
The 1,510  overdose deaths last year amounted to 
more than a 353%  increase over 2013. The report 
also attributed fentanyl laced drugs as accounting 
for the increase in deaths. 
People aged 30-39 were the hardest hit in January 
2019 with 26  illicit drug overdose deaths followed 
by 50-59 year-olds at 23  deaths. People aged 40-49 
years-old accounted for 19 deaths while those aged 
19-29 had 11 deaths. Vancouver had the most 
deaths at 24  followed by Surrey (8), Victoria  (5), 
Chilliwack (4), Langley (4), Kelowna (3), Maple 
Ridge (3) and Vernon (3).   
Males continue to die at 
a l m o s t a 4 : 1 r a t i o 
compared to females. In 
January 2019, 75  males 
had died while  there 
were 25 female deaths.
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The 2019 data indicates that most illicit drug 
overdose deaths (87.8%) occurred inside while 
11.1%  occurred outside. For 1 death, the location 
was unknown. 
“Private residence” includes residences, driveways, 
garages, trailer homes.
“Other residence” includes 
hote l s , mote l s , rooming 
houses, shelters, etc.
“Other inside” includes facilities, occupational sites, 
public buildings and businesses.
“Outside” includes vehicles, streets, sidewalks,  parks, 
wooded areas, campgrounds and parking lots.
DEATHS SINCE PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY
In April 2016, BC’s provincial health officer 
declared a public health emergency in response to 
the rise in drug overdoses and deaths. The number 
of overdose deaths in the 34 months preceding the 
declaration (Jun 2013-Mar 2016) totaled 1,317. 
The number of deaths in the 34 months following 
the declaration (Apr 2016-Jan 2019) totaled 3,858. 
This is an increase of 193%.
110
23
56
Private Residence
Other Residence
Other Inside
Outside
Unknown
Deaths by location: Jan-Feb 2018
Source: Illicit Drug Overdose Deaths in BC - January 1, 2009 to 
January 31, 2019.  Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, 
Coroners Service. March 19, 2019.
TYPES OF DRUGS
The top five detected drugs relevant to illicit drug overdose deaths from 2016 - 2018 were fentanyl, which 
was detected in 79.5%  of deaths, cocaine (49.8%), methamphetamine/amphetamine (31.2%), ethyl 
alcohol (26.6%), and heroin (19.8%). 
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1. Snapshot day was April 18, 2018, a predetermined business day meant to represent a typical day of operations.
Note: Short-term facilities include those with an expected length of stay of less than three months. 
Long-term facilities include those with an expected length of stay of three months or longer.
For more information, see the full Juristat article: Canadian residential facilities for victims of abuse, 2017/2018.
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Survey of Residential Facilities for Victims of Abuse.
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“In Service: 10-8”
Sign-up Now
Are you interested in regularly receiving the In 
Service: 10-8 newsletter by email. You can sign 
up by clicking here and then clicking on the 
“Sign up” link:
This “Sign up” link will take you to the free 
Subscription Form that only requires an email. 
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BACHELOR OF LAW ENFORCEMENT STUDIES
BACHELOR OF EMERGENCY & SECURITY MANAGEMENT
Expand your academic credentials and enhance your career options. 
Gain the theoretical background, applied skills and specialized 
knowledge for a career in public safety.
keeping communities safe
enforcing the law
on the front line
Apply today. JIBC.ca 604.528.5590    register@jibc.ca 
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
Be the one
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Upcoming Investigation & Enforcement Skills Courses
To register for any of the following courses, click on the course code below or contact the JIBC 
Registration Office at 604.528.5590 or 1.877.528.5591 (toll free). You can check Ways to Register for 
other registration methods and for assistance from the registration office. View the full 2019 Course 
Calendar online for a full list of upcoming Investigation & Enforcement Skills courses in 2019.
UPCOMING ONLINE COURSES  
August 7-September 4, 2019
Internet Open Source Investigations (INVE-1022)
September 3-October 4, 2019
Report Writing for Professional Investigators 
(INVE-1005)
UPCOMING COURSES IN NEW 
WESTMINSTER  
May 1-3, 2019
Introduction to Criminal Law (INVE-1001) 
May 4-18, 2019
Introduction to Investigative Skills & Processes 
(INVE-1003) 
May 25, 2019
Personal Safety (INVE-1013) 
May 29-31, 2019
Giving Expert Witness Testimony (INVE-1007)
June 3, 2019
Tactical Communications (INVE-1012) 
UPCOMING COURSES IN VICTORIA
May 1-2, 2019
Introduction to Criminal Justice System (INVE-1000)
May 7-9, 2019
Introduction to Administrative Law (INVE-1002)
May 15-17, 2019
Introduction to Criminal Law
Apply for the Investigation & 
Enforcement Skills Certificate
Complete the Investigation & Enforcement Skills Certificate, 
an academic credential that can help you pursue or 
advance your in the field of investigation, enforcement and 
public safety. Many people who have completed the 
requirements for the certificate have gone on to a variety of 
rewarding careers. Apply online today. For more 
information, visit the Investigation & Enforcement Skills 
Certificate 
webpage.
15-007
Online Graduate  
Certificate Programs
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 
TACTICAL CRIMINAL ANALYSIS
Expand your credentials and advance your career with 
these online graduate certificates. Learn through real world 
challenges, current cases, curriculum and techniques. 
Gain the specialized theoretical foundation and applied skills 
to function successfully as an analyst.
604.528.5843 JIBC.ca/graduatestudies
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
